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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GERALD E. HULBERT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 16197 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent Gerald E. Hulbert brought the present action 
to recover attorneys fees and court costs incurred in his 
successful defense of a series of grand jury indictments, 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30a-l-3 
(Supp. 1977). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following a non-jury trial in the District Court, the 
Honorable Christine M. Durham granted judgment for the 
plaintiff-respondent in the amount of $62,384.99. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the present appeal be dismissed 
or denied and the judgment of the lower court affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent adopts the Findings of Fact as they were 
entered by the court below (R. 109-113) and as set forth in 
appellant's brief. The undisputed facts can be summarized as 
follows: 
In 1975, a Utah State Grand Jury over a period of 
several months issued 12 indictments against Gerald E. Hulbert 
for alleged acts and/or omissions committed by him in his 
capacity as Chairman and Director of the Utah State Liquor 
Control Commission. Mr. Hulbert retained the law firm of 
Rawlings~ Roberts & Black to represent him in the defense of 
said indictments. During the ensuing two and one-half years 
that firm spent over 500 hours, made 65 court appearances, 
conducted two trials, and two appeals in the defense of 
Mr. Hulbert. The result was that Mr. Hulbert was exonerated 
on all 12 indictments. 
In 1977, the Utah Legislature enacted Utah Code Annotated 
§63-30a-2 (Supp. 1977), which reads as follows: 
If a state grand jury indicts an officer 
or employee in connection with or arising 
out of any act or omission of that officer 
or employee during the performance of his 
duties, within the scope of his employment 
or under color of his authority, and that 
indictment is quashed or dismissed or 
results in a judgment of acquittal, unless 
the indictment is quashed or dismissed upon 
appljcation or motion of the prosecuting 
attorney, that officer or employee shall 
be entitled to recover from the state the 
reasonable attorney's fees and court costs 
necessarily incurred in the defense of 
that indictment. 
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A retroactive provision of the statute made it applicable 
to Mr. Hulbert's claim for reasonable attorney's fees. 
Pursuant to said statute, Mr. Hulbert submitted to the 
Honorable Scott M. Matheson, the Honorable David s. Monson 
and the Honorable Robert B. Hansen a claim for attorney's fees 
and costs, itemizing and substantiating by affidavit a total 
sum of $77,815.65. After the statutory 90-day period had 
elapsed without response from the State of Utah, and pursuant 
to the procedures outlined in the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et seq., {Supp. 1965), Mr. Hulbert 
filed an action against the State of Utah in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, pursuant 
to the above referenced Utah statute for reimbursement for 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Said case was tried 
commencing on the 30th day of October, 1978, before the 
Honorable Christine M. Durham, District Judge, without a jury. 
Thereafter, on the 8th day of November, 1978, Judge Durham filed 
and entered a Memorandum Decision followed by a judgment in 
favor of Mr. Hulbert, entering findings that the reasonable 
fees and costs necessarily incurred by Mr. Hulbert in the defense 
of said grand jury indictments was the sum of $62,384.99. 
At the time of trial, Mr. Hulbert testitied that his initial 
agreement with the firm in May of 1975 after his first indictment 
provided that he would pay $5,000.00 as a retainer, with an 
additional $5,000.00 to be due if the matter came to trial and 
$2,000.00 more if an appeal was taken. {R. 143-44). Additional 
indictments were forthcoming, but there was no further discussion 
-3-
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or agreement regarding fees for the firm's representation of 
Mr. Hulbert in those matters until the fall of 1976, due to the 
state of Mr. Hulbert's mental and physical health during the 
course of the proceedings. (R. 146-49) 
In the fall of 1976, Mr. Hulbert approached Hr. Wayne 
Black with regard to his additional fee obligation. He 
requested a bill because he needed it for his "own peace of 
mind." (R. 149) He subsequently received a letter from 
Mr. Wayne Black indicating that the firm would accept $18,500.00 
as a total fee for representing Mr. Hulbert on the various 
indictments. (Exhibit 4-P) Mr. Hulbert regarded this amount 
as nominal and a mere gesture. He felt indebted to the firm 
and promised to pay a proper amount when he obtained the means. 
(R. 153 and 324-26) 
After the enactment of Utah Code Ann. §63-30a-l, et seq., 
(Supp. 1977), an itemization of the work done by the firm was 
compiled to assist Mr. Hulbert in presenting his claim for 
attorney's fees to the State. A claim for $77,815.65 was 
presented to the members of the Board of Examiners. 
Following the District Court trial, Mr. Hulbert amended 
this claim by substituting the Court's judgment, thereby 
reducing his original claim to the amount of the judgment, 
i.e., $62,384.99. 
After hearings before the Board of Examiners, Governor 
Matheson voted to approve the modified claim, and Lieutenant 
Governor David S. Bonson and Attorney General Robert B. Hansen 
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voted to defer said claim based upon the representation of 
Attorney General Robert B. Hansen that he intended to appeal 
the judgment entered by Judge Durham and thus to await the 
outcome of said appeal. 
The notice to the legislature with regard to the action 
taken by the Board of Examiners was submitted in a letter 
dated December 8, 1978. It made note of a specific recommendation 
by the Board of Examiners and submitted the claim to the 
legislature for further action. 
The legislature, in H.B. 426, entitled Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, appropriated $50,000 as settlement of the 
claim of Mr. Hulbert. H.B. 426 was signed into law by the 
Governor of the State of Utah on March 16, 1979. 
A warrant for payment of this appropriation has been 
issued by the Department of Finance but is being withheld by 
the Attorney General, who refuses to honor either the specific 
appropriation of the legislature or the judgment rendered below. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTER 
JUDGMENT ON RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT. 
The appellant is contending in this Court, as he did 
below, that the power vested in the Board of Examiners by the 
Constitution to examine all claims against the State deprives 
the courts of jurisdiction to enter judgment on such claims. 
Even a cursory reading of the constitutional provision in 
question, however, reveals that no such limitation is embodied 
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in its express terms. Art. VII, §13 of the Utah Constitution 
provides, in relevant part, that; 
[The Governor, Attorney General and Secretary 
of State] shall, also, constitute a Board of 
Examiners, with power to examine all claims 
against the State except salar~es or compensa-
tion of officers fixed by law, and perform 
such other duties as may be prescribed by 
law; ana no claim against the State, except 
for salaries and compensation of officers 
fixed by law, shall be passed upon by the 
Legislature without having been cons~dered 
and acted upon by the said Board of Examiners. 
(emphasis added) 
The obvious intent of this section is to provide a 
limitation on the disbursement of public funds by the legislature; 
a limitation which has never been questioned by the respondent. 
While the judgment rendered by the District Court necessarily had 
to be submitted to the Board of Examiners as a condition 
precedent to its satisfaction, such a restriction did not 
affect the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear this 
action and determine the state's liability under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30a-l et seq. (Supp. 1977). 
The narrow issue presented by the appellant's first point 
has been previously decided by this Court. In Campbell Bldg. 
Co. v. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 424, 70 P.2d 857 (1937), 
a case involving a suit against the Commission for damages and 
for the balance due on a contract, this Court pointed out that 
there is no provision in the Utah Constitution which prohibits 
the legislature from waiving the immunity of the state, and held 
that the legislature had effected just such a waiver with regard 
to written contracts entered into by the State Road Commission. 
In response to the Attorney General's contention that the 
-6- l 
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exclusive procedure for filing claims against the state was with 
the Board of Examiners, the identical claim raised in this case, 
the Court noted that any judgment obtained might have to be 
presented to the Board of Examiners before the plaintiff could 
receive payment, but stressed that the procedure for executing 
on a judgment did not affect the jurisdiction of a Court in 
rendering that judgment. 
It is not now necessary for us to decide 
whether the only method by which plaintiff 
could satisfy any judgment it might obtain 
would be by filing the claim evidenced 
by the judgment with the Board of Examiners 
and, in the event there was no appropriation 
out of which it could be paid, to then go 
to the Legislature for such appropriation. 
How the judgment may be enforced, if one is 
obtained, is quite another matter from the 
problem for us to decide, which is, whether 
plaintiff may proceed in the Courts to have 
its claim liquidated. (citations omitted) 
70 P.2d at 861. The Court held that the plaintiff could maintain 
his action for liabilities arising out of a written contract, 
because even though the state "may refuse to respond in damages 
and leave a claimant without any remedy, as it may refuse to 
pay its bonds, the obligation remains 70 P.2d at 862. 
The respondent submits that this decision is dispositive of 
the Attorney General's contention that Article VII, Sec. 13 of 
the Utah Constitution is a direct limitation on the jurisdiction 
of Courts to hear claims and enter judgments against the State. 
The appellant's conclusion is a product of the failure to 
recognize the vital distinction, highlighted by the Court in 
Campbell, supra, between the two separate procedures of 
-7-
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obtaining a judgment on the one hand and successfully satisfying 
that judgment on the other. It is fundamental that any judgment 
entered against the State is not self-executing, and Article VII, 
§ 13, is a limitation on how such a judgment can be satisfied. 
It.has no bearing on how it is obtained. 
While the appellant has offered a voluminous authority to 
show that the Board of Examiners has a broad and constitutionally 
based power to review all claims against the State prior to the 
legislature taking any action on such claims (a proposition with 
which the plaintiff does not take issue), only the case of 
Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 143 P. 626 (1913), makes even 
an oblique reference to the effect of the Board's power on the 
jurisdiction of courts to hear claims against the State. That 
case, however, must be viewed in light of the conditions 
prevailing when it was written. Faced with a lower court decision 
which had found liability on the part of the State and sequestered . 
particular state funds out of which the judgment was to be ~ 
satisfied, the Court held that the State was immune from suit 
and that even in a case where immunity had been waived, a court 
could not designate how a judgment would be satisfied (if at 
all). 
The Court went on to note that although the State was 
immune from suit, there was a procedure through which claims 
against the State could be heard, namely by filing claims with 
the Board of Examiners. The Court highlighted this procedure 
to show that the State "[has] not arbitrarily, as they might 
I 
I 
I 
1. 
I 
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have done, shielded the State from being sued in the courts, 
but they did so for good and sufficient reason." 134 P. at 631. 
So by way of dicta, the court suggested that there was no ~eason 
for the State to consent to being sued in the courts because a 
constitutional framework already existed for bringing claims 
against the State. The language suggesting a jurisdictional 
limitation, therefore, represents a judicial justification for 
adhering to the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity. Now 
that the doctrine has lost its vitality by express decree of the 
legislature, the historical rationalization for its existence 
need not .detain this court. The most that can be said of the 
Wilkinson decision is that it contained some language implying 
that there was a limitation on court jurisdiction contained in 
Article VII, Sec. 13. Clearly, any such implication was directly 
renounced twenty years later in Campbell, supra. Yet the 
Wilkinson case is the only authority offered by the appellant 
which even inferentially supports the argument that the District 
Court had no jurisdiction to hear a claim against the State. 
The remainder of the cases cited by appellant stand collectively 
for the proposition that the Legislature cannot pay claims which 
have not been first reviewed by the Board. This proposition is 
both unassailable and irrelevant to the issue at bar. Those 
cases mandate the procedure to be followed after judgment is 
obtained, but have no bearing on the question of the jurisdiction 
of courts to render a judgment. 
Mr. Hulbert filed this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30a-2 (Supp. 1977), which provides for attorney's fees 
-9-
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and court costs necessarily incurred in the successful defense 
of grand jury indictments. 
Section 3 of the same act specifies that: 
[t]his act shall apply to claims arising 
prior to the effective date of this 
act so long as those claims are filed in 
the manner provided in the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act and within two years after the 
cause of action arises. (emphasis added) 
It is the respondent's contention that this reference to 
the procedures outlined in the Governmental Immunity Act was 
intended by the legislature to incorporate not only the provision 
regarding notice, but all of the procedures set forth in the 
ImmunityAct for processing claims against the State. Those 
procedures are as follows: 
Any person having a claim for any injury to 
person or property against a governmental 
entity or its employee may petition said entity 
for any appropriate relief including the award 
of money damages. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 
(Supp. 1965) 
A claim against the state or any agency thereof 
as defined herein shall be forever barred 
unless notice thereof is filed with the 
attorney general of the State of Utah and the 
agency concerned within one year after the 
cause of action arises. Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-12 (Supp. 1965) 
If the claim is denied, a claimant may 
institute an action in the district court 
against the governmental entity in those 
circumstances where immunity from suit has 
been waived as in this act provided. Said 
action must be commenced within one year after 
denial or the denial period as specified 
herein. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-15 (Supp. 1965) 
The district courts shall have exclusive original 
jurisdiction over any action brought under this 
act and such actions shall be governed by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in so far as 
they are consistent with this act. Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-16 (Supp. 1965) 
-10-
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That it was the intent of the legislature to incorporate 
by reference all of the procedural aspects of the Immunity Act 
is clearly shown by the title of the Act under which the 
respondent claims, which recites the purposes of the bill as 
follows: 
An act relating to governmental affairs; 
providing for the reimbursement to officers 
and employees of the state of legal fees and 
costs necessarily incurred in the successful 
defense of grand jury indictments; defining 
terms; and providing that the act shall 
apply to all claims submitted with~n the 
t~me l~m~ts and ~n the manner prov~ded ~n 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Laws of 
Utah 1977, ch. 245. (emphas~s added) 
The reference in section 63-30a-3 to filing claims "in 
the [same] manner" as is done under the Immunity Act has to 
include the procedures outlined in the Immunity Act for following 
the claims through to judgment if they are initially denied or 
ignored by the State. Otherwise the Act would be superfluous 
and without effect. 
As we have seen, the appellant's only objection to accepting 
this procedure is that the Attorney General feels it would 
operate as an unconstitutional circumvention of the Board of 
Examiners. Yet, under the Immunity Act itself, the district 
-1~1-____________________________________ ... 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
courts of the state are given exclusive jurisdiction to 
entertain actions against the state when a claim has been 
duly made upon the state and subsequently denied or ignored. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-15 & 16 (Supp. 1965). This jurisdiction 
is granted without regard to whether the legislature has made 
appropriations for payment of that claim. Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-23 (Supp. 1965) provides the procedure to be followed 
when no appropriation is available, including submission of the 
judgment to the Board of Examiners. 
The clear effect of this last provision is to insure that 
there is no conflict with Art. VII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution. 
~fuile this procedure may be somewhat cumbersome, it is 
constitutional. As one writer has noted: 
Article 7, Section 13, of the Utah 
Constitution provides that "a Board of 
Examiners • . . [shall have] power to 
examine all claims against the State." 
The Utah Supreme Court has given this 
provision a literal interpretation, thus 
granting the board almost unlimited power 
to make recommendations concerning the 
ultimate disposition of "claims" against 
the state. This power encompassed tort 
claims against the state prior to the 
Immunity Act and required that such 
claims be submitted to the board. The 
claims, together with recommendations 
from the board, were then passed upon by 
the legislature, generally in conformity 
with the board's recommendations. 
In analyzing the court's broad interpre-
tation of the power of the board in 
relation to the language of Section 23 
of the Immunity Act, there appears 
to be an incongruous procedural system, 
which it has been argued, might make 
the Immunity Act unconstitutional by 
bypassing the board. Further consideration, 
however, would seem to indicate two ways 
in which any constitutional difficulties 
could be obviated. 
-12-
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First, section 23 of the Immunity Act 
provides that a "claim approved by the 
state • • • or any final judgment 
obtained against the state shall be 
presented • • • for payment if payment 
••• is otherwise permitted by law." 
If payment if not authorized by law, 
then the claim must be "presented to 
the board of examiners ••• " It seems 
clear that if an approved claim or 
judgment cannot be satisfied under the 
constitution until it has been acted upon 
by the board of examiners, then no 
approved claim or judgment would be 
"otherwise permitted by law" within the 
meaning of the Immunity Act. Thus, 
even though all approved claims and 
judgments may have to be routed through 
the board of examiners, at the risk of 
delay in satisfaction by the board or 
by the legislature, the statute can 
easily be construed to be consistent with 
the constitution. 
Note: The Utah Governmental Immunity Act: 
An Analys~s. 1967 Utah L. Review 120. 
This statutory scheme vests jurisdiction in the district 
courts for all claims filed and denied under the provisions of 
the Immunity Act. It also makes it clear that the legislature 
envisioned the possibility of judgments being rendered which 
would have to be submitted to the Board of Examiners before 
they could be paid. The appellant has asserted that this 
section of the Immunity Act is unconstitutional because: 
(1) The constitutional and statutory 
powers of the board of examiners would 
thereby be reduced to a mere auditing; 
and (2) The constitutional power of the 
legislature to make appropriations of 
public funds would be usurped by the 
courts. 
Both of these arguments are at odds with the facts. The 
section does not even imply any attempted direction to the Examiners 
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on how they should evaluate and vote on judgments obtained 
pursuant to the Act. The Examiners are left absolutely free 
to recommend or not recommend the claims for payment. T<fuile, 
pragmatically, the court action would undoubtedly facilitate 
a more expeditious review of the factual basis of any claim, 
thereby relieving the Board of Examiners of a burdensome duty, 
it is not suggested that the Board would be bound by any court 
findings. Certainly no usurpation of any legislative function 
is involved because even claims approved by the examiners would 
still have to be submitted to the legislature for payment, 
and their decision to pay or not would be final and binding. 
In short, granting jurisdiction to the courts to hear claims 
against the state does not involve any conflict with Article VII, 
Sec. 13, of the Constitution as long as the judgment rendered by 
such a court is ultimately submitted to the Board prior to being 
passed upon by the legislature. 
The fundamental error that permeates the entire argument 
of the appellant is the failure to recognize the distinction 
between obtaining and satisfying a judgment. The Attorney 
General obfuscates the jurisdictional question with unnecessary 
recitation of the powers of the Examiners, which the respondent 
does not contest. He fails, however, to come to grips with 
the issue of a court's jurisdiction to hear claims against the 
state. The Supreme Court has resolved this issue in favor of 
court jurisdiction in Campbell, supra, forty years before. 
Respondent respectfully submits that this point on appeal 
is without merit. 
-14-
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POINT II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL FULLY 
SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT ENTERED BELOW. 
In considering the appellant's c~ntion that the 
District Court judgment is not supported by the evidence, tbis 
Court should bear in mind that the appellant has not challenged 
the finding that $62,384.69 represents a reasonable amount for 
fees and costs for the services provided in defending Mr. Hulbert, 
but is only taking issue with the finding that such reasonable 
fees and costs were "necessarily incurred" within the meaning 
of Utah Code Ann. §63-30a-2 (Supp. 1977). When stripped of its 
recurrent diatribe regarding the plight of taxpayers, the 
appellant's argument can be easily stated: the fees and costs 
awarded were not necessarily incurred because Mr. Hulbert's 
counsel offered to accept less. Such an argument fails to take 
into account the plain meaning of the term "incurred" and the 
most basic principles of law pertaining to fees "incurred" as 
a result of attorney-client relationships. 
The trial court, in its memorandum decision, made the 
following observations concerning the fee arrangement in 
Mr. Hulbert's prosecutions: 
After the first group of indictments was 
issued in May of 1975, the Black firm 
suggested a $5,000 retainer in connection 
with the research and preparation of 
plaintiff's defense of the indictments, 
which plaintiff paid. An additional 
$5,000 was estimated for trial of the 
matter if necessary, and $2,000 for 
appeal. 
A second and later a third set of 
indictments were handed down in July 
and August of 1975. Rawlings, Rober~s . 
and Black continued to represent pla~nt~ff 
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on all of the issued counts. The matter 
was vigorously prosecuted by special 
attorneys general appointed by the State 
and by the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office, and the defense was protracted, 
complicated, time-consuming and difficult. 
Attendant publicity contributed to the 
task of defense counsel. Plaintiff's 
mental and physical health deteriorated, 
and as a result, his counsel deferred any 
discussion of fees. Plaintiff, however, 
insisted on a billing in 1976, because 
of his strong sense of personal and moral 
obligation to pay for services rendered and 
a desire to know where he stood vis-a-vis 
the fee obligation. In response to plaintiff's 
urgent request, Black wrote a letter in 
September of 1976, offering to consider 
$18,500 the total fee, taking into account 
the $8,500 actually paid prior to that date 
by Hulbert. Plaintiff, although unemployed 
and still ill, told Mr. Black that the fee 
suggested in the September letter was token 
in nature and unacceptable to him. The two 
subsequently agreed orally that plaintiff 
would pay the law firm a reasonable and 
fair fee "if and when" plaintiff became 
able to do so 
The testimony indicates that plaintiff 
intended his obligation to be one for 
reasonable fees at a then undetermined 
level. H.r. Black apparently intended 
that obligation to be contingent upon 
plaintiff's future ability to pay, if 
any. (R. 98-99) 
These findings are supported by both the testimony of 
Mr. Wayne Black (R. 325) and Mr. Hulbert (R. 153). The appellant 
asserts, without acknowledging the conversation between Mr. Black 
and Mr. Hulbert subsequent to the letter of September 3 and 
the note in response, that no court would enforce against a 
client an agreement to pay more than he was informed would 
be required for his attorney's service. (See Brief of 
Appellant at page 37). This allegation, supported with 
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no authority but the statement that it is "so patently 
obvious as to defy reason" is directly contrary to this Court's 
holding in Oliver v. Mitchell, 14 Utah 2d 9, 376 P.2d 390 (1962). 
In that case, Mr. Mitchell had been represented by D. H. 
Oliver on a charge of first degree murder. Oliver was appointed 
as counsel by the trial court to handle the defense, as Mitcbell 
was an indigent. M~tchell, who was fully entitled to representation 
by Oliver without any obligation to pay him for his services 
promised to pay his attorney "when he could" and wrote to 
Mr. Oliver from prison after his conviction and renewed this 
pledge. 
While in prison, Mitchell began receiving payments as the 
insurance beneficiary of his brother, who had been killed in 
military service. Mitchell informed Oliver of this fact and 
told him he couldn't pay until he was released from prison. 
Oliver brought an action to recover a fee for his services in 
Mitchell's defense and garnished the insurance fund being 
held by prison officials. 
In upholding the trial court's award of fees to Oliver, 
the Court, in an unanimous decision, indicated that 
It is incontestable that plaintiff 
performed a valuable service for whi~h 
there is usually a charge, and of wh~ch 
defendant freely availed himself without 
dissent and, indeed, for which defendant 
promised to pay. Granting the fact ~he 
court appointed Mr. Oliver as an off~cer 
of the court to act as defendant's counsel 
as a public service, and that a criminal 
defendant's right to counsel is absolute 
regardless of his ability to pay; does 
_,.,_ 
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this relieve the defendant of his 
promise to pay when able? We know of 
no rule or reason why this should be 
held to convert into a mere moral 
obligation. Indigents are as legally 
competent to contract as other men 
and their procedural rights are the 
same not greater. A promise to pay 
his attorney is to the credit of an 
indigent defendant for as yet in Utah 
the court appointed defense attorney 
receives no compensation by the county 
or other public authority and he must 
rely exclusively on the possible future 
ability of his client to pay. In a 
majority of cases the client may never 
be able to properly compensate his 
attorney but this is no reason to 
prevent an attorney from recovering 
from one who can. 
14 Utah 2d at 12. 
There is no distinguishable difference between the above 
cited case and the present action. Mr. Hulbert, who could have 
accepted Mr. Black's offer of a nominal charge for the firm's 
services but promised to pay a reasonable value when able, stands 
in the identical position of the indigent who promises to pay 
when able though he otherwise would not be under obligation to 
compensate his counsel. In both cases the happening of a 
subsequent event triggered the fee obligation (obtaining a 
fund which made the client "able" to pay) and in both cases 
the fees are enforceable as promised by the client. 
Modifications of the original conditions and terms of 
compensation due to attorneys from clients are not per se 
unenforceable. In Rudd v. Crown International, 26 Utah 2d 263, 
488 P.2d 298 (1971), the Court was asked to review an award 
of attorney's fees wherein counsel had originally indicated 
his fee would be $35 per hour, but as the representation 
-18-
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became more detailed and time-consuming, he changed his fee 
to first $5,000 and then $10,000. The Court upheld the 
$10,000 award and indicated that the amount of the fee which 
is reasonable isn't controlled by any set formula and the 
judgment of the trial court in determining a reasonable fee 
is presumed correct because of the advantaged position of the 
judge to hear and determine the issues raised concerning 
reasonableness of fees. See also Wallace v. Build, Inc., 
16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 (1965). 
Mr. Hulbert, in seeking and receiving the assistance of 
Rawlings, Roberts and Black in his defense on the indictments 
filed subsequent to his original agreement with the firm, 
obviously incurred an obligation for payment to the firm even 
in the absence of an agreement so specifying. It is axiomatic 
that an individual who receives services at his own request is 
under a duty implied in law to compensate the party providing 
such services for their reasonable value in the absence of a 
specific agreement as to the amount of compensation. See 
Trafton v. Youngblood, 69 Cal.2d 17, 442 P.2d 648 (1968); 
Carter v. Wooley, 521 P.2d 793 (Okla. 1974). This obligation 
was incurred as the services were performed, and Mr. Hulbert's 
subsequent promise to pay a reasonable fee when able is a 
promise which is legally sufficient to bind him to an express 
contract. As stated in A. Corbin, Contracts §211 at 303-04 
(1952) 
A past debt, still existing and 
enforceable, is a sufficient basis 
for the enforcement of a new promise 
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by the debtor to pay it. This is true, 
whether the past debt is contractual 
or quasi-contractual in character. 
One who is already bound to pay for 
services rendered at his request can 
be sued upon his subsequent express 
promise to pay for the debt. 
Professor Corbin also notes that in the law of contracts 
a subsequent promise to pay a debt previously owing is enforceable 
even if there is a deficiency of some type in legal rights of the 
creditor to collect on the previous debt. 
This authority is simply cited to demonstrate that Judge 
Durham's holding that Mr. Hulbert's promise to pay a reasonable 
fee for the services rendered on his behalf was an enforceable 
promise is on solid footing in the law of contracts. 
The evidence is sufficient to support the finding that 
Mr. Hulbert "necessarily incurred" the reasonable fees associated 
with his defense by requesting and accepting the firm's 
representation, and that his subsequent promise to pay that 
reasonable amount constituted an agreement enforceable against 
him, which therefore is enforceable against the State by virtue 
of Utah Code Ann. §63-30a-2 (Supp. 1977). 
The appellant has also challenged the validity of the 
contract on the basis that it was made contingent upon 
plaintiff's future ability to pay. As demonstrated by the 
Oliver decision, supra, this contingency doesn't affect the 
validity or enforceability of the agreement if the fact upon 
which future liability is premised (ability to pay) is realized. 
In the appellant's words "[t]he uncertainty and 1iffiness' of 
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any contract founded such a factual basis is so apparent to 
require no further elucidation." (Brief of Appellant at 41) 
Again, the appellant's statement of the law, which is so 
obvious as not to need supporting authority, is directly 
contrary to the prevailing authority. Prof. Corbin indicates 
that 
[W]hen one is contracting on the basis 
of new consideration, he can limit his 
duties as he sees fit. The same is true 
where he is promising on the basis of a 
"past consideration". • • 
The new promise may be made conditional on 
any new performance or event. Frequently, 
a debtor promises to pay the debt as soon 
as he is financially able to do so. This 
makes his "ability" to pay a condition 
precedent to a right of action; and it 
must be alleged and proved by the creditor. 
What constitutes ability to pay is indeed 
a variable quantity; and often, in the 
light of surrounding circumstances, a 
promise so worded has been interpreted 
as a promise to pay within a reasonable 
time. 
A. Corbin, Contracts §215 at 308-09 (1952). 
Clearly, one of the most distinguished scholars in the 
field would have some reservations about the Attorney General's 
view of the law applicable to contingent obligations, and is 
of the opinion that the promise to pay for past services 
when "able" is both enforceable and routine. 
There can be no question that the Legislature fulfilled 
the condition which gave rise to Hr. Hulbert's duty to pay 
and at the same time created his right to recover that 
liability from the State. 
-21-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
The final objection of the appellant to the fee as found I 
by the lower court is that it represents a modification of the 
attorney-client agreement after its initial formulation by the 
parties and is therefore, he argues, presumptively invalid. 
This argument is flawed in two respects. 
First, Mr. Hulbert never had an express agreement with the 
firm for their representation on the indictments subsequent to 
May of 1975 and his liability for that service initially arose 
by operation of law; that is, his obligation to pay for services 
rendered on his behalf at their reasonable value is an agreement 
implied by law. Thus, his promise to do just that, pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee, wasn't a modification of his earlier 
contract, it was an expressed intention to fulfill the duty 
previously implied. 
Second, as the cases cited by appellant demonstrate, the 
rule that agreements between clients and counsel altered during 
the course of representation should be closely scrutinized by 
the court is to protect against attorney's misusing the 
confidences and influence he has with respect to his client's 
affairs and to prevent over-reaching by counsel. However, as 
demonstrated by the Rudd v. Crown International decision, supra, 
modifications are not presumptively invalid and, in the absence 
of some objection by the client, the reasonableness of the fee 
found at trial will not be overturned on appeal. 
The cases cited by appellant, and the rationale implicit 
to their holdings, are clearly inapplicable to a case such as 
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this, where the client insists that his counsel's attempt 
to modify the fee for the benefit of the client will not be 
accepted. The Oliver case, supra, is again enlightening on 
this issue, as the Court there lauded the client for his 
expressed promise to pay that which he otherwise wouldn't owe 
and did not find any irregularity with his voluntary acceptance 
-
of a greater obligation than required by the terms of his 
initial attorney-client arrangement, even though his counsel 
benefitted financially from that alteration. 
An agreement to pay what one owes, despite personal 
financia~ impediments which preclude actually ever being 
judicially compelled to do so, is certainly not contrary to 
public policy and is to be wholeheartedly supported. 
It is a fundamental proposition that the findings of the 
trial court will not be overturned on appeal if there is any 
substantial evidence to support them, Sullivan v. Turner 22 Utah 
2d 85, 451 P.2d 907 (1968), and that where a case is tried to 
the court without a jury, evidence must be reviewed in the light 
most favorable to sustain the findings of the court and the 
judgment based upon such findings. Lake Creek Irr. Co. v. Clyde, 
22 Utah 2d 222, 451 P.2d 375 (1968); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 
133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962). The appellant has not actually 
attacked the factual determination of the court below (that 
Mr. Hulbert agreed to pay reasonable attorney's fees, and that 
Mr. Black agreed to accept the same, when Hulbert became able to 
pay) , but has argued that the Conclusions of Law entered by the 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court don't flow from such findings. The respondent submits 
that the authority cited above shows conclusively that the 
findings of the court support the conclusion that Mr. Hulbert 
necessarily incurred $62,384.99 in reasonable attorney's fees 
and court costs and that the arguments raised by appellant in 
opposition to such a conclusion are contrary to decided case law 
in this and other jurisdictions, the views of legal scholars 
and not supported by the logic and reasoning of the appellant's 
own authority. 
POINT III. UTAH CODE ANN. §63-30a-3 (SUPP. 1977) IS A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID RETROACTIVITY CLAUSE CREATING A FINANCIAL 
LIABILITY ON THE PART OF THE STATE FOR A PREVIOUSLY INCURRED 
MORAL OBLIGATION. 
This Court has previously acknowledged that neither the 
United States Constitution nor the Utah Constitution contain 
any provision which by its express terms prohibits the 
legislature from enacting measures which have retroactive 
application. Mecham v. State Tax Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 321, 
410 P.2d 1008 (1966). The Court further noted that the 
legislature, in fact, could lawfully, enact measures which 
have a reasonable retrospective application upon subjects 
or actions occurring prior to the date of the convening of 
that body. See also Garrett Freightlines v. State Tax Comm'n, 
103 Utah 390, 135 P.2d 523 (1943). Indeed, while Utah has a 
specific statute which provides that acts which do not expressly 
indicate that they are to have retroactive effect will not be 
construed to have such application, Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 
(1953) , there is nothing in the organic law of the State which 
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calls into question the validity of retroactive legislation. 
The appellant concedes that Utah has no direct constitutional 
prohibition regarding retroactive legislation, but asserts that 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30a-3 (Supp. 1977) is unconstitutional because 
it violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Art. I, §7 of the Utah Constitution. This 
argument is premised upon the contention that by creating a 
liability on the part of the State for past actions the 
legislature divested the State of a previously vested interest 
in violation of constitutional restrictions on legislative 
prerogative. 
It can be quickly noted from a reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that it is a restriction on the State's ability to 
enact laws which have certain proscribed effects on individuals, 
but doesn't speak at all to the power of a state to alter the 
rights of the state itself. The Amendment provides, in relevant 
part, that 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, w~thout due 
process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. (emphasis added) 
Not surprisingly, given the absence of any directive to 
the contrary, courts have universally recognized that a state 
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legislature is free to modify, impair or eliminate the vested 
right of the State itself and the constitutional limitations 
on the legislature's actions only come into play when vested 
rights of individuals are retroactively impaired. The general 
rule, as stated in 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §417 at 106 
(1954), is as follows: 
As long as private rights are not 
infringed, the state may constitutionally 
pass retrospective laws waiving or 
impairing its own rights, or those of 
its instrumental subdivisions or of the 
public generally. 
In Riesberg v. State, 243 N.Y.S.2d (Ct. of Claims 1963), 
a New York court addressed the question of whether the enabling 
act of certain legislation, which operated to give certain 
injured parties a cause of action against the State for injuries 
which were received prior to the date of the legislation and at 
a time when the State had not yet waived its immunity with regard 
to such claims, was unconstitutional as a retroactive impairment 
of the State's vested rights and "special" or "private" 
legislation for the benefit of specific people -- the exact 
claim asserted by the appellant in this case. The court held 
that the statute was constitutional and stated: 
While it has been said that, generally, 
retrospective laws are unconstitutional 
if they destroy or disturb existing or 
vested rights, nevertheless the State may 
constitutionally pass retrospective laws 
waiving or impairing its own rights, and it 
may impose upon itself new liabilities 
with respect to transactions already past. 
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A statute should be upheld as constitu-
tional if it is possible to do so 
without disregarding the plain command 
or necessary implication of the 
fundamental law. 
The Legislature can recognize and 
provide redress for the State's liability 
for past obligations equally with its 
right to waive its immunity for claims 
to arise in the future. 
243 N.Y.S.2d at 890. 
This holding is consistent with all authority discovered 
by the respondent. In State ex rel. Meyer v. Cobb, 467 S.W.2d 
854 (Mo. 1971), the Missouri Supreme Court cited the applicable 
rule with regard to an enactment affecting rights of the State. 
The state may constitutionally pass a 
retrospective law impairing its own 
rights, and may impose new liabilities 
with respect to transactions already 
past on the state itself. or on the 
governmental subdivisions thereof. 
467 S.W.2d at 856. 
This rule has such general acceptance that even states 
which do have constitutional provisions forbidding retroactive 
legislation interpret those restrictions not to apply to laws 
which only affect the rights of the state. In New Orleans v. 
Clark, 95 u.s. 644 (1877), the United States Supreme Court 
considered a case arising out of Louisiana where the plaintiff 
was suing on a bond obligation he claimed was owed by a 
municipality which had been annexed into New Orleans. At 
the time of such annexation, the Louisiana legislature had 
enacted a measure specifically requiring New Orleans to pay off 
the bonds. Both the old municipality and the City of New Orleans 
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contended that there was no lawful obligation to the plaintiff 
and that the act imposing the burden of payment on New Orleans 
was unconstitutional in light of the state's constitutional 
limitation on retroactive legislation. The Supreme Court 
responded that 
The Constitution of Louisiana of 1868, 
which provides that no retroactive law 
shall be passed, does not forbid such 
legislation. A law requiring a municipal 
corporation to pay a demand which is 
without legal ob~igation, but which is 
equitable and just in itself, being 
founded upon a valuable consideration 
received by the corporation, is not a 
retroactive law, -- no more so than 
an appropriation act provid~ng for the 
payment of a pre-ex~sting claim. The 
const~tutional ~nh~bition does not apply 
to legislation recognizing or affirming 
the binding obligation of the State, 
or of any of its subordinate agencies, 
with respect to past transactions. It 
is designed to prevent retrospective 
legislation injuriously affecting 
individuals, and thus protect vested 
rights from invasion. (emphasis added) 
95 U.S. at 655. 
This same holding was reached in Graham Paper Co. v. 
Gehner, 59 S.'i'7.2d 49 (Ho. 1933), where the court found that 
"the provision of the [Missouri] Constitution inhibiting laws 
retrospective in their operation is for the protection of 
the citizen and not the state." 59 S.W.2d at 51. See also, 
State Highway Dep't. v. Bass, 29 S.E.2d 161 (Ga. 1944); 
Kershner v. Sganzini, 45 N.M. 195, 113 P.2d 576 (1941); 
Henry v. McKay, 3 P.2d 145 (Hash. 1931); 16 Am.Jur.2d, 
Constitutional Law §418 at 758 (1964) ("A state may constitu-
tionally pass a retroactive law 1"hich impairs its own rights.") 
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Simply asserting the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment doesn't strengthen the appellant's argument, as 
the United States Supreme Court since the turn of the century 
has clearly noted that "the mere fact that a statute is 
retroactive in its operation does not make it repugnant to 
the Federal Constitution." League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 
(1901). 
Appellant's cited authority does not address the State's 
waiver of its own "vested rights" and is therefore wholly 
inapposite to the issue presented by the facts of this case. 
Equally unsuited to his argument are the appellant's own 
citations indicating that a state legislature may constitutionally 
give legal effect to previously existing moral obligations (see 
Brief of Appellant at 48), which actually supports the 
respondent's position. Though the Attorney General argues that 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30a-l, et seq. (Supp. 1977) wasn't intended 
as a legal remedy for a moral obligation, the respondent 
submits that it is manifest that such was the precise and 
only purpose of the Act. It was intended to extinguish the 
financial obligations incurred by a public official indicted 
for acts occurring in the performance of government duties, 
obligations incurred in successfully resisting the efforts 
of the State to punish him for acts committed while in the 
service of the State. It represents an acknowledgment that 
having to resist the vast resources of the State in defending 
a criminal prosecution is an onnerous task, the cost of 
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which should not, morally, fall upon the public servant who 
is ultimately exonerated of the charges. 
The Act's limitation to public officials is certainly 
understandable and rational in view of the· greater exposure 
they face due to their high visability, the constant public 
pressure to eradicate government waste and abuse of power --
be it real or imagined -- and the distinct groups of criminal 
charges to which only public officials are subject. There 
can be no doubt the legislation was designed to remedy a 
moral wrong previously visited upon the respondent and others 
by the forces of the State and to insure protection for others 
similarly wronged in the future. As such, it is clearly 
constitutional legislation as demonstrated by appellant's own 
authority. 
Additionally, the appellant asserts that because 
Mr. Hulbert was active in lobbying for passage of the bill 
and that it inurred to his personal benefit, it is unconstitu-
tional "private" legislation in violation of Article VI, §26 
of the State Constitution. That section provides that "[n]o 
private or special law shall be enacted where a general law 
can be applicable." The force of this argument is severely 
undercut by the recognition that all liabilities acknowledged 
for past obligations relate to particular and defined individuals, 
sometimes to single individuals not a member of any class, but 
that the acknowledgment and payment of these liabilities, 
often on the express recommendation of the Board of Examiners, 
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is not constitutionally invalid because the legislature has 
the inherent power to pay claims of citizens, or provide a 
means for payment, by admitting its obligation either through 
direct compensation for a particular claim or by creation of 
a cause of action against the state for individuals who share 
a common species of claim. 
In the instant case, Mr. Hulbert is a member of a defined 
class given a cause of action by legislative enactment~ he 
was not, however, given an action not available to others 
similarly situated and his entitlement did not result in any 
prejudice to the rights of other individuals or class of 
individuals of the State. Under the test set forth in State 
v. Kallas, 97 U. 492, 94 P.2d 414 (1939), such legislation 
is general. The definitions set forth there are as follows: 
Laws which apply to and operate uniformly 
upon all members of any class of persons, 
places, or things requiring legislation 
peculiar to themselves in the matters 
covered by the laws in question, are 
general and not special • . 
Special legislation is such as relates 
either to particular persons, places, 
or things, or to persons, places, or 
things which, though not particularized, 
are separated by any method of selection 
from the whole class to which the law 
might, but for such legislation, be 
applied, while a local law is one whose 
operation is confined within territorial 
limits, other than those of the whole 
state or any properly constituted class 
of locality therein. 
94 P.2d at 420. See also, Nelson v. Miller, 25 Utah 2d 277, 
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480 P.2d 467 (1971)~ Unterrnyer v. State Tax Comm'n, 102 Utah 
214, 129 P.2d 881 (1947)~ Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah 
Ins. Guarranty Ass'n, 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977). 
In the latter case, this Court began its discussion of 
the issue of what constitutes special legislation by acknowledging! 
that the Supreme Court "makes every reasonable presumption in 
favor of constitutionality and will not nullify a legislative 
enactment unless it is clearly and expressly prohibited by 
the Constitution." 564 P.2d at 753. The Court then acknowledged 
the definitions set forth in Kallas, supra, and quoted with 
approval -the definition of special legislation contained in 
People v. Western Fruit Growers, 22 Cal. 2d 494, 140 P.2d 13 
(1943), indicating that a law 
is special legislation if it confers 
particular privileges or imposes peculiar 
disabilities, or burdensome conditions in 
the exercise of a common right~ upon a 
class of persons arbitrarily selected, 
from the general body of those who stand 
in precisely the same relation to the 
subject of the law. The constitutional 
prohibition of special legislation does 
not preclude legislative classification, 
but only requires the classification to 
be reasonable. 
140 P.2d at 19-20. 
In Utah Farm Bureau, supra, this Court found that the 
Utah Insurance Guaranty Association Act created a public 
corporation designed to fill a public need and to promote the 
public welfare by aiding citizens who might otherwise innocently 
fail to have required insurance due to the insolvency of their 
insurers. The Act, and the corporation it created, was intended 
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to effectuate the detection and prevention of insolvency on 
the part of insurers and to accomplish this purpose all insurers 
operating in the state, with certain defined exceptions, were 
required to become members of the Association and contribute 
an assessment to its operation. The Court held the creation 
of such a corporation to be founded upon a reasonable classi-
fication, equally applied to all insurers falling within the 
defined class, and that the subject matter of the Act making 
such a classification was a proper area for legislative action. 
The Court, therefore, upheld the Act as constitutional general 
legislation. 
The reasoning cited in support of the Utah Farm Bureau 
holding is equally relevant and controlling in the case at bar. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30a-l, et seq. (Supp. 1977) provides that a 
particular class of individuals (officers or employees of the 
state or its political subdivisions) with an entitlement to 
recover fees and costs incurred in the successful defense of 
grand jury indictments. This entitlement is arguably a 
"privilege" conferred upon the class defined, but it is 
expressly made available to all members of the class so 
the first test for a general law set forth in Kallas, supra, 
(uniform application to members of the class) is met. The 
remaining test (reasonableness of the class as a subject of 
legislative enactment) requires simply that there be a rational 
basis for conferring such a "privilege" on public employees 
without extending the benefits to all citizens of the State. 
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In testing the Act against this standard, the Court should 
take cognisance of the rule acknowledged by the courts of 
several other jurisdictions; namely, that the appropriate test 
to apply on review is substantially the same as employed in 
evaluating whether legislation is violative of the Equal 
Protection of the Fourteenth Amendment if a suspect classification 
isn't involved. See, e.g., State v. Lewis 559 P.2d 630 (Alaska 
1977); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (1977); Serrano 
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971). That test, as 
articulated in State v. Mason, 3 Utah 2d 289, 283 P.2d 213 (1955) 
provides that 
A classification is never unreasonable 
or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion 
features so long as there is some basis for 
the differentiation between classes or 
subject matters included as compared to 
those excluded from its operation, provided 
the differentiation bears a reasonable 
relation to the purposes to be accomplished 
by the act. 
In order to see whether the excluded 
classes or transactions are on a different 
basis than those included, we must look 
at the purpose of the act. The objects 
and purposes of a law present the touch-
stone for determining proper and improper 
classifications. 
It is only where some persons or 
transactions excluded from the operation 
of the law are as to the subject matter 
of the law in no differentiable class 
from those included in its operation 
that the law is discriminatory in the 
sense of being arbitrary and unconsti-
tutional. If a reasonable basis to 
differentiate those included from those 
excluded from its operation can be found, 
it must be held constitutional. 
283 P.2d at 215. 
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The Act in question doesn't contain an expression by 
the legislature of its purpose, but respondent submits that 
it cannot be doubted that the purpose of the legislation was 
to relieve public officials and government employees of 
financial obligations incurred in successfully defending 
themselves on grand jury indictments arising out of the 
performance of their duties on behalf of their employer. 
The reasonable basis for limiting this attorney's fee 
provision to officers and employees of a public entity, and 
not awarding such an entitlement to all citizens who successfully 
defend grand jury indictments, can be determined with minimal 
effort if examination is made of the history of grand jury 
prosecutions in this state, coupled with a recognition of 
the greatly expanded criminal sanctions to which a public official 
is subject and the State's legitimate interest in providing 
assurance to public employees that working for the government 
will not expose them to exaggerated risks of financial insecurity 
without regard to the culpability of their conduct in the 
performance of their duties. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-19-7 (1953) sets forth the statutory 
duties of the grand jury. It provides that 
The grand jury must inquire into the 
case of every person imprisoned in the 
jails of the county on a criminal charge 
and not indicted or informed against; 
into the conditions and management of 
the public prisons within the county; 
and into the wilful and corrupt misconduct 
in the office of public officers of every 
description within the county. 
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Under modern rules of criminal procedure$, as shaped 
by the vast constitutional protections afforded to arrestees, 
including rights to speedy trial, prompt arraignment and 
preliminary hearing, the grand jury's duty to incarcerated 
individuals, charged but not informed against, is now merely 
a vestige of earlier procedure not accompanied by actual responsi-
bilities. Almost exclusively, therefore, the duty of a grand 
jury is to investigate public officials. 
A brief examination of Title 76, Chapter 8 of the Utah 
Criminal Code reveals that Parts 1 (corrupt practices), 2 
(abuse of office), and about half of 4 (offenses against 
public property) of the chapter define and describe offenses 
applicable almost exclusively to public officials. Given 
this maze of possible offenses and an investigatory body with 
no real duty to investigate anything else, public employees 
stand a markedly greater chance of being inducted than other 
citizens. Combined with the attendant publicity normally 
surrounding the prosecution of a public servant, the spectre 
of grand jury indictment looms as a greater "occupational 
hazard" for present and prospective public employees than 
most callings and entirely justifies the State in recognizing 
this fact legislatively and providing the class with a remedial 
"privilege". 
The foregoing demonstrates that the Act in question makes 
a classification which has a rational relation to the purposes 
to be accomplished by the legisaltion and that it applies 
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equally to all members of the class. Under the established 
law of this state such an act is constitutional and not 
violative of Art. VI, §26 of the State's Constitution. As 
stated in 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction §40.18 at 219 
(4th Ed.) 
Acts conferring franchises, privileges, 
and immunities are general and not 
special legislation unless there is 
an arbitrary standard imposed as to 
those who may avail themselves of the 
privileges. 
No such arbitrary standard is imposed by this Act, which 
was largely patterned after a previously enacted measure designed 
to insulate public officials from the financial hazards associated 
with possible civil liability and legal expenses which might 
be incurred by public employees. See Utah Code Ann. §63-48-1 
et seq. (2d Rep. Vol. 1978). 
The appellant's assertion that the retroactivity provision 
of the Act alters the measure into "private" legislation is without 
support. It has been previously demonstrated that there is no 
constitutional objection to retroactive legislation in a case 
such as this, so the mere fact that valid class legislation is 
coupled with a valid retroactive provision doesn't work any 
transformation regarding the constitutionality of the statute. 
Both components are valid and their combination is as well. See 
Riesberg v. State, supra. Appellant has presented no authority 
to the contrary. 
Finally, it must be noted that Art. VI, §26 of the 
Constitution doesn't prohibit all special legislation, but 
only in cases "where a general law can be applicable". Even 
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if this Court were to determine that the Reimbursement of Legal 
Fees Act constituted special legislation, there would be no 
abridgment of any privileges or immunities of an individual by 
the Act, so no Fourteenth Amendment problem would arise, and if 
the Act is intended to benefit only Mr. Hulbert for his unique 
travails, then no general law would be applicable and there 
would still be no constitutional problem. By saying no special 
legislation is permissable where a general law is applicable, 
the Constitution impliedly acknowledges that there will be 
cases where special laws can be enacted because general laws 
aren't applicable. This is precisely why the legislature can 
make payments to individuals after the Board of Examiners reviews 
claims against the state and makes its recommendations. Such 
allocations are a species of equitable compensation made on 
particular facts applicable only to the claimant. Courts of 
other jurisdictions have frequently acknowledged that the 
legislature may consider moral obligations as sufficient 
justification for the appropriation of state monies to 
individuals (see Annot. 172 A.L.R. 1407), and Utah has 
considered such appropriations at every legislative session 
since the time of statehood. See Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 
359, 374 P.2d 516 (1962). Whether or not attorney's fees 
have previously been the subject of such claims is totally 
irrelevant. The legislature has the constitutional power 
to recognize the obligation and pay the claim individually 
by appropriation if it is a singular claim, or enact a general 
law giving relief to the whole class to whom they feel the 
-38-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State is so obligated. The ironic fact of this case is that 
while they have done both, the State's highest legal officer 
refuses to accept their right to do either. Such a refusal 
is without support in the law. 
POINT IV. THIS APPEAL PRESENTS NO JUSTICIABLE CLAIM AND 
THE ISSUES RAISED ARE MOOT. 
Throughout the course of Mr. Hulbert's attempt to recover 
on his claim, the Attorney General has insisted that any such 
claim would have to be submitted to the Board of Examiners. 
~1r. Hulbert, after proceeding through the court system in the 
manner indicated in the Act, did exactly that. He submitted 
the judgment to the Board, who voted 2-1 to recommend to the 
legislature that the claim not be paid, pending appeal by the 
State of the judgment. The legislature, despite this recom-
mendation, appropriated $50,000 for full payment of Mr. Hulbert's 
claim. 
There is no dispute that Mr. Hulbert did submit the claim 
and that the Board issued a recommendation, but the Attorney 
General is now apparently contending that this action did not 
constitute having the claim "acted upon" within the meaning 
of Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution. Plaintiff-
Respondent believes that such an assertion is clearly refuted 
by the Board's own description of their conduct, but would 
further indicate to the Court that, by statute, the Board of 
Examiners cannot take "no action" on a claim, but must make 
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a recommendation to the Legislature. Utah Code Ann. §63-6-13 
(1953) provides, in relevant part, that: 
The board must at the time designated 
proceed to-exaffiine and adjust all such 
claims referred to in section (63-6-11) 
of this act, and may hear evidence in 
support of or against them, and shall 
report to the legislature such facts 
and recommendations concerning them as 
it may think proper. (emphasis added) 
This is supplemented by the next section of the act, 
which provides: 
The board must make up its report and 
recommendat~ons at least thirty days 
before the meeting of the legislature; 
and a brief abstract of the report, 
showing the claims rejected, and those 
allowed and the amounts thereof, must 
be published in a newspaper published 
at the seat of government before the 
meeting of the legislature for such time 
as the board may prescribe. (emphasis 
added) Utah Code Ann. §63-6-14 (1953) 
No option is provided for "not acting", and the recommendation 
deemed appropriate by the Board is the action which a claiMant 
may appeal to the Legislature, if he is aggrieved by such 
action, as provided in Utah Code Ann. §63-6-17 (1953). 
Hr. Hulbert took such an appeal to the Legislature and 
they disregarded the recommendation of the Board and appropriated 
$50,000 for settlement of the claim. There is absolutely no 
question that the Legislature can make such an appropriation 
despite a different recorrunendation by the Board. In Wood v. 
Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374 P.2d 516 (1962), this Court took 
note of the Legislature's authority to do so. 
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The provision of Sec. 13 of Art. 
VII, quoted above, that, "* * * no 
claim * * * shall be passed upon by 
the Legislature without having been 
considered and acted upon by the said 
Board of Examiners" plainly indicates 
that the action of the Board was not 
intended to be so final and basolute 
as to preclude other action by the 
Legislature. We can perceive no other 
meaning then that after the Board has 
performed its duty of examining and 
acting upon such claims, the Legislature 
may thei). "pass upon", i.e., exercise its 
judgment, on them and take such action 
as it deems appropriate ••• To decide 
otherwise would produce the illogical 
result of turning the subsequent 
presentation of claims to the Legislature 
into an empty gesture whose only purpose 
would be to rubber-stamp the action of 
the Board. 
13 Utah 2d at 362. 
The Budge case involved review of the issuance of a writ 
of mandamus to compel the Attorney General to make payments 
to claimants to whom the legislature had appropriated money 
despite the Board of Examiners' recommendation that such claims 
be denied. This Court held that the Order compelling payment 
was properly entered and offered the following admonition 
concerning the appropriate relationship between the executive 
officers who comprise the Board of Examiners and the Legislature. 
It is also pertinent to observe that 
if one of the executive officers 
constituting the Board could circumvent 
legislative action by refusing to pay 
out funds appropriated to pay such a 
claim, problems would arise in deter-
mining how far actions of that character 
could extend; and may well result in 
perplexities reiating to the balance 
of power between the executive, legislative 
and judicial branches of our state government. 
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These departments, though to a degree 
interrelated and cooperating in the 
overall functions of government, have 
separate powers which should be safe-
guarded in order to preserve this 
balance which has always been recognized 
to be one of the advantages of our system. 
In case of doubt or uncertainty on a 
problem such as here exists, we think it 
wise and desirable to adopt an interpretation 
of the law and to follow a policy which will 
fit harmoniously into and sustain that 
balance rather than to choose an alternative 
which would provide a foundation for disrupting 
it. 
13 Utah 2d at 362-63. 
This Court further noted that the power of the Legislature 
to settle claims was unquestionable and not restricted by the 
powers granted to the Board of Examiners. 
Our Legislature is directly representative 
of the people of the sovereign state, and 
thus has inherently all of the powers of 
government except as otherwise specified 
by the State Constitution. By way of 
comparison, it is significantly different 
in that respect from the federal government, 
which is a government of limited powers 
that can properly do only those things 
within the scope of the powers expressly 
granted to it by the states through the 
Federal Constitution; whereas, the State 
Legislature, having the residuum of 
governmental power, does not look to the 
State Constitution for the grant of its 
powers, but that Constitution only sets 
forth the limitations on its authority. 
Therefore, it can do any act or perform 
any funct~on of government not spec~f~cally 
prohibited by the State Constitution. In 
order to justify a conclusion that the 
power to approve and pay such claims has 
been taken away from the Legislature and 
placed exclusively within the control 
of the Board of Examiners, it would have 
to clearly so appear, which is not the 
case here. 
13 Utah 2d at 363. 
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The Court indicated that the only restriction on the 
Legislature's power was some showing of the legitimacy of the 
claim. "In order to justify approval and payment there must 
be at least some semblance of a valid claim. • II 13 Utah 2d 
at 363. This requirement is clearly satisfied in the instant 
case because Mr. Hulbert's claim, arising by statute, has been 
the subject of a full trial on the merits resulting in a 
judgment in his favor. 
The Legislature having acted to pay the claim, and 
Mr. Hulbert having agreed to the terms of that payment, there 
is nothing left for this Court to resolve on appeal. The 
Attorney General's refusal to comply with the mandate of the 
Legislature is not justified under the clearly established law 
of this State. 
The Attorney General's posture in this regard is most 
baffling. He resisted the court action by saying the Board 
of Examiners - Legislature route was, constitutionally, the 
only acceptable course for presenting the claim. After the 
respondent followed just that course, the Attorney General 
refused to distribute the appropriation, claiming the courts 
had to decide Mr. Hulbert's entitlement. Such internally 
inconsistent arguments underscore his real opposition to payment: 
he just doesn't like the idea. It should require little 
argument to support the proposition that the Attorney General's 
personal views on the relative merit of legislative enactment 
or appropriations should play no role in his duty to comply 
with the law. While the appellant's entire brief is couched 
in terms of what an "injustice" is being perpetrated on the 
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taxpayers, the appellant has lost sight of the fact that the 
legislature, the elected representatives of the taxpayers, is 
the body constitutionally mandated to make judgments on the 
wisdom of particular fiscal items, and by ignoring that fact the 
Attorney General is overstepping the bounds of his office in the 
exact fashion warned against in Wood v. Budge, supra. 
The respondent respectfully submits that he has complied 
with every conceivable requirement imposed by law in asserting 
his claim against the State, and the legislature having lawfully 
allocated a sum for paying that claim, this appeal should be 
dismissed as the dispute between Mr. Hulbert and the State has 
been resolved, and only that dispute is properly at issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments raised by appellant in opposition to the 
judgment entered below are all contrary to the established law 
of this State. The jurisdiction of the District Courts to 
entertain claims against the State and to render judgment thereon 
has been directly sustained by this Court and is an integral 
part of Utah's present statutory procedure for presenting such 
claims. The issue of how such judg~ents might lawfully be 
satisfied, while intriguing, has no bearing on the court's 
jurisdiction and is not relevant to this appeal. 
The judgment for reasonable attorney's fees entered below 
is supported by the factual findings and the Conclusions of 
Law based on those findings. This Court has previously 
sustained an award for fees based on a promise to pay for 
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services where the recipient of those services otherwise 
would have had no obligation to do so, and that holding, which 
is controlling here, is consistent with the law and theory which 
has developed at common law on the enforceability of promises 
made for past services rendered. This binding agreement between 
the respondent and his counsel forms the basis of the "reasonable 
attorney's fees necessarily incurred" for which Mr. Hulbert is 
entitled to compensation, and the State's obligation is for the 
amount so found. 
There is not now, nor has there ever been, any per ~ 
constitutional restriction on the legislature's power to pass 
retroactive measures, and the legislature is free to waive any 
vested state interest attached to past actions. The only 
requirement the Constitution imposes on enactments granting 
ne\v rights to an individual or to a class is that there be a 
rational basis for the creation of such rights and for limiting 
them to the individual or class. In the instant matter, either 
the State's interest in insuring that its own employees not 
suffer unjustified financial ruin for performance of their 
duties or the State's interest in remedying past injustices 
inflicted on a citizen by agencies of the State government is 
sufficient rationale to support the legislation. The first 
will sustain a general enactment and the latter a special law. 
Whichever this Act is viewed as, it is still constitutionally 
permissable. 
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Finally, this appeal is presently moot because the 
legislature has resolved Mr. Hulbert's claim through 
appropriation. 
For the reasons stated above, the respondent respectfully 
submits that this appeal should be dismissed or denied. 
DATED this day of June, 1979. 
BRANT H. WALL 
M. DAVID ECKERSLEY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing were 
sent to Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of the State of 
Utah, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this day of June, 1979. 
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